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I. INTRODUCTION
Efficient allocation of reenlistment bonuses requires the ability to estimate the effect that the bonus will have on reenlistments in an occupational specialty. Previous research, conducted in 2002 and 2005, (both reported in Hogan et al., 2005) 1, estimated the effects of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program on Zone A (17 months to 6 years of active service), Zone B (6 to 10 years of service) and Zone C (10 to 14 years of service) reenlistment decisions made between FY1990 and FY2000. In this analysis, we extend the years analyzed to include FY2001 through FY2004. The additional years of data include Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). We tested the ability of the existing model to predict reenlistment decision-making post-FY2000. To improve fit, we generated new econometric estimates by military occupational specialty (MOS), career management field (CMF) and Zone using the more recent years of data, and conducted out-of-sample prediction testing to confirm the validity of the updated model. We then discuss the implications of the estimates for the implementation of the SRB Management System.
This study expands on the existing reenlistment models by exploring the potential impact of bonuses on Soldiers in Zone D-those who have 15 through 19 years of service-as well as retirement-eligible personnel. During the period of our data, the Army has offered SRB after the second reenlistment point only very rarely and, until recently, there has been little reason to consider bonuses for Soldiers in Zone D. The opportunity cost of leaving the Army before the 20 year mark, once one is beyond the 10-12 years of service point, is so high that an SRB would have a negligible impact on the decision. Nor has there been an interest in analyzing the retention decisions of retirement-eligible Soldiers, who are more likely to be motivated by taste for service or other non-monetary, difficult-to-measure considerations. However, the Army has become interested in expanding monetary incentives to senior Soldiers working in certain high-demand occupations such as Special Forces. 2 These experienced personnel are often in great demand by the civilian sector, including some who are sought by industry to provide security support in Iraq.
In order to incorporate the most recent data and examine the reenlistment decisions of Zone D + Soldiers (i.e., Zone D plus retirement-eligible), we had to consider several important policy changes. The Army began applying Stop Loss policy in FY02-the first time since the Gulf War in 1991. Soldiers under Stop Loss are not eligible to separate, necessitating adjustments to the data.
Additionally, the vast majority of Zones C and D reenlistments are in the Indefinite Reenlistment Program (IRP), which began in October 1998. Indefinite Reenlistments are not associated with contracts of a specific length. Similar to officers, IRP Soldiers can separate at any time (unless they are deployed or have accepted deployment orders). Once in the IRP, Soldiers can serve without additional approval or formal reenlistment until the retention control point for their grade. The policy necessitated adjustments to the model for Zones C and D. By
Army policy, SRB is not offered for IRP reenlistments without approval from HQDA.3 However, from a force management perspective, it is useful to understand the impact of monetary incentives on retention behavior.
4
II. DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
The Army provided data on reenlistment decisions made from FY1990 through FY2004. We received annual extracts of the Enlisted Master File (EMF) for September 1989 through September 2000 together with extracts of the Enlisted Loss File. Data for FY2001-FY2004 were drawn exclusively from the EMF, using quarterly extracts to identify leavers. We used these data to identify Soldiers eligible to make stay/leave decisions, characterize their decisions, and generate explanatory variables for the estimation. We generated individual records for each reenlistment decision observed in the analysis period. In addition, we calculated annualized cost of leaving (ACOL) values for each decision-maker. As in previous analyses, ACOL is expressed in 1995 dollars.
The models capture the probability that a Soldier will reenlist, conditional on his or her ACOL and demographic, educational and career characteristics. For an extensive discussion of the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) framework, construction of the ACOL variable, and other variables used in the model, see Hogan, et al. (2005) . 5 Our construction of the dependent variable-the stay-leave decision indicator--took into consideration the Indefinite Reenlistment Program and Stop Loss.
A. Indefinite Reenlistment Program
Starting in October 1998 (FY99), reenlisting Soldiers in grade E6 or higher, who have completed at least 10 years of service on the date of reenlistment, enter the Indefinite Reenlistment Program. 6 The policy applies to the vast majority of Zone C, Zone D and retirement-eligible decision-makers who entered the reenlistment window in FY98 and later. On average, between FY98 and FY04, 76 percent of Zone C Soldiers eligible to separate from the Army were in the IRP.7 Although Soldiers serving on indefinite enlistments are not eligible to receive SRB without approval from HQDA, we included them in the analysis in order to understand the effect of pay for Zone C and beyond. The ACOL parameter can be used to compute the effect of additional monetary incentives on retention should the Army need to expand bonus programs for senior personnel.
Once in the program, Soldiers can separate at any time, and we included them as eligible decision-makers every year. For a given year's decision the dependent variable was set equal to 1 if the Soldier appeared in the data the following year. "9 "Stop Loss" means that the soldier may not choose to leave at his or her ETS. This window for a voluntary decision to leave the Army is delayed by the "Stop Loss" policy. "Stop Move" means that the member will remain at the current station or deployment area rather than rotate to another location. months of additional obligation some time during the ETS window. Soldiers were characterized as losses if their loss records showed a transaction date within 90 days of ETS (FY 1990 (FY -2000 or if they were missing from subsequent years' files (FY 2001 (FY -2004 . We set the dependent variable to zero if the Soldier decided to leave the Army.1 0 Soldiers who separated involuntarily or left more than 90 days prior to their ETS were censored from the final data.
Thus, higher SRBs, through the effect on ACOL, are predicted to increase reenlistment by inducing Soldiers to sign up for a commitment of at least 3 years, the minimum required for receipt of an SRB, instead of leaving. Extensions-signaled by a change in ETS of less than 24 months 1 1 -were dropped from the regressions, for two reasons. First, a newly imposed unitbased Stop Loss is observationally equivalent to an extension in our database. Second, extensions were excluded from the prior analyses. Including extensions in the model (in the denominator) had a negligible impact on the ACOL coefficients.
The IRP suggests a different approach for Zones C and D+. All decision-makers were treated as making annual decisions, so the distinction between reenlistment and extension was not relevant. We set the dependent variable equal to one for a given year if the Soldier was in the database the following year, and zero otherwise. We address Zone C and D models in greater detail in subsequent sections. Table 3 presents the predicted probabilities of reenlistment when the parameters from the previous model are used to forecast 2001-2004 reenlistment rates. The predicted value is the mean probability generated by the model for the observations in a 5% hold-out sample. Because of the policy and operational changes characteristic of the post-9/11 period it is not surprising to find substantial differences between actual and predicted values. The residuals (Hogan, et al. 2005) ; applying the same model to the more recent years yields an average prediction error of +13 points. Can incorporating more recent years of data into the underlying model improve forecasting? We updated the model for Zones A and B to include the years FY90-FY04, including the explanatory variables from previous models, but adding some year and policy dummy variables. For Zone C, we modified the specification in order to reflect the IRP. Army-wide estimates are presented below, as are results for the 20 largest MOS and CMF.
D. Reenlistment trends
III. MODEL UPDATE
13 Zone A reenlistments take place after completion of between 1 and 5 years of service (that is, starting in the second year); the Zone B window is 6-10 completed years of service; Zone C reenlistees have completed 11 through 13 years of service; "postZone C" refers to Soldiers who have completed at least 14 years of service. Retirement eligibles have completed at least 19 years of service and are in their 201h year or beyond.
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We calculated the responsiveness of the reenlistment rate to the change in SRB, based on the 
aA COL where R is the mean reenlistment rate and B is the estimated coefficient for the ACOL variable. The second term is the impact of a one-level increase in SRB on ACOL. The one-level SRB increase was in relation to the modal SRB in a Zone. For the MOS and CMF-level estimates by Zone, the SRB increase was in relation to the modal SRB for the MOS by Zone or CMF by Zone.
A. All-Army Results for Zones A and B Table 4 shows the results of logit estimation using the updated, Army-wide dataset, which includes all MOS and CMF. Pooling the FY01-04 data with that of prior year has some effect on coefficient values in comparison to the models that use only FY90-00 data (Hogan et al. 2005 ). 14 For the most part, the signs and significance levels are preserved (although some of the education variables in Zone B are no longer significant).
The impact of a one-level increase in SRB is lower when recent years of data are incorporated into the model. We calculate an increase of 3.58 percentage points, compared to an increase of 6.4 points reported in Hogan et al (2005) .
The marginal effects reported in table 4 imply that Zone B decision-makers are slightly more responsive to a 1-level increase in SRB than are Soldiers in Zone A, while previous studies have found SRB to have its greatest impact on Zone A. Note, however, that the ACOL coefficient and marginal effects show that Zone A decision-makers remain more responsive to monetary incentives of a given amount. Our result arises because the average basic pay is higher in Zone B, so that a one-level increase in SRB translates into a greater dollar amount than does a onelevel increase offered to Zone A.
The "targeted" SRB (TSRB) program was instituted to provide an incentive for those in a particular MOS, ASI (Additional Skill Identifier) and SQI (Special Qualifications Identifier) to reenlist for a position at a specific unit or location. The purpose of the TSRB is to channel qualified Soldiers into particular positions at locations that are difficult to fill. For those MOS that have positions included in the TSRB program, it typically means that if the eligible Soldier reenlists and agrees to serve in a specific, targeted position for the skill, the reenlistment bonus award level will be greater than it otherwise would. The TSRB typically adds 0.5-1.0 to the award multiple for the SRB. Hence, the TSRB program is a form of incentive for a voluntary assignment system in which qualified Soldiers volunteer for specific positions at specific locations.
In our data set, TSRB is included in FY 1999 and FY 2000. We do not have data regarding the assignments of Soldiers who reenlist, nor do we have information regarding the location of the positions for which the targeted SRB incentive was offered. Rather, we have only an indication that the Soldier was eligible for a targeted SRB. We include eligibility for a targeted SRB in the reenlistment equation. It is included in the analysis as an indicator variable. If an eligible Soldier was offered a TSRB, an indicator variable was set equal to 1.0. Otherwise, the TSRB indicator was set equal to zero. The TSRB program continued into FY 2001 and beyond, but changed in that it was based more on unit staffing than particular MOS positions. Because of this, we limit our analysis to FY 1999 and FY 2000.
The results in Table 4 suggest that eligibility for a TSRB had a very large effect on reenlistment probability. Taken literally, these results indicate that eligibility for a TSRB increased the probability of reenlistment by 41 percentage points at Zone A and almost 25 percentage points at Zone B. This effect, however, is much greater than one would expect based on the increased financial incentive. An increase in the SRB award level by one would increase the probability of reenlistment by only about 4 percentage points. In fact, an increase in SRB that was due to the TSRB would probably have a smaller effect because one could only receive the increased SRB by accepting an assignment at a, presumably, less desirable location. The magnitude of the estimated TSRB effect, then, is a puzzle.' 5 B. All Army Results for Zone C Because of the IRP program, our specification was somewhat different in Zone C than for Zones A and B. We considered two approaches. The first approach was to exclude all Soldiers in the IRP from the estimation. The rationale is that Army policy generally prohibits offering SRBs for Soldiers who, by virtue of their grade and YOS (years of service), are serving on an indefinite enlistment contract. This biases the Zone C sample to include a disproportionate number of individuals who are relatively low-graded (E5 and below) in relation to their years of service.
The second approach was to include all Zone C decision-makers, regardless of their IRP status, and to control for IRP in the estimation. From a bonus management standpoint, the advantage of this approach is that it gives policy makers the option of exploring the impact of expanding the SRB program to more senior personnel in Zone C. All decision-makers were treated as making annual decisions. We set the dependent variable equal to one for a given year if the Soldier was in the database the following year, and zero otherwise. In keeping with this approach, the Zone C estimates do not exclude extensions. This differs from the Zone A and B models, and raises the risk that the data include Soldiers under unit-based Stop Loss (whether a Stop Loss is in place or not, IRP Soldiers who are slated for deployment are not permitted to separate). For this model, we only included the years in which the IRP would have affected decisions-FY98 forward.
This model differs from that for Zones A and B in that it excludes the unemployment rate and adds an indicator variable set equal to one if the decision-maker was in the Indefinite Reenlistment Program. In addition, the TSRB dummy variable used in the Zones A and B regressions is excluded.
15 One, purely mechanical, explanation for the large effect would be that the TSRB coding in the underlying data indicated not that the Soldier was eligible for the TSRB, but that the Soldier actually received a TSRB award. Hence, the TSRB indicator would coincide with a reenlistment. This, of course, would be a methodological error. The actual data, however, indicate that fewer than 100% of those indicated as eligible for TSRB reenlisted. In FY 1999, the data suggest that 18,545 were eligible and that 14,519 reenlisted-a rate of 78.3%. In FY 2000 the data indicate that 46,539 were eligible and that 43,121 reenlisted-a reenlistment rate of 92.7%. Hence, we cannot conclude that only those that received the TSRB were recorded as eligible in the data. Nevertheless, the observed reenlistment rates for TSRB eligibles are too high to be explained by the financial incentives. Hence, it is a puzzle. Applying the formula above, the impact of a 1-level increase in SRB would translate into a change in annual continuation of approximately one-half of a percentage point. Note that this is substantially less than the impact of 1.8 points found in Hogan, et al. (2005) for the years before the introduction of the IRP. However, that analysis used as the dependent variable a reenlistment rate, implying a multi-year obligation. The difference in findings reflects primarily the change in the nature of the dependent variable. When the difference is accounted for, the two estimates are close.16
C. MOS and CMF Level Results
The tables below report the ACOL coefficients for the 20 largest CMF (table 6) and 20 largest  MOS (table 8) , for Zones A, B and C. In addition, we report the projected impact of a one-level increase in SRB (tables 7 and 9). For the MOS-and CMF-level ACOL estimates by Zone, we used the same model that was used to estimate the all-Army impact in each respective zone. The effect of an SRB increase was calculated in relation to the modal SRB for each MOS -Zone or CMF -Zone combination.
At both the MOS and CMF levels, most of the ACOL coefficients were of the expected sign and statistically significant (most of the negative values were not significant). 
D. Predictive Accuracy of Zone A, B and C Estimates
The challenges inherent in forecasting reenlistment behavior are exacerbated by rapid changes in policy and operations characteristic of the post 9/11 years. In general, forecasts are improved when they are based on as much relevant data as possible; but this need not be the case if the additional data points reflect unique, external pressures on individual behavior.
To determine the forecast accuracy of our models, and compare them to the results from using prior years' data alone to predict recent reenlistment, we created hold-out samples for each Zone for the years 2003 and 2004-the most recent two years in the database. From the holdout data, which comprised 5% of observations from each year 2003 and 2004, we computed predicted and actual reenlistment rates, and the residual (predicted minus actual rate). See Table 10 . The predicted values were computed as the average predicted probability of reenlistment. The second figure in the residual column reports the earlier-reported error (table  3) 
IV. RETENTION OF ZONE D AND RETIREMENT-ELIGIBLE PERSONNEL
To explore monetary incentives beyond Zone C, we analyzed the relationship between retention and ACOL for Zone D and retirement-eligible Soldiers in all occupations. We present two models--one that is restricted to Zone D and another that also includes retirement-eligibles.
On average since FY98, over 97 percent of eligible decision-makers are in the IRP and may separate at any time, unless they are deployed. Therefore, we treat them as making a series of annual stay-leave decisions and set the dependent variable equal to 1 for a given year if the Soldier in the Army at the beginning of the year appeared in the following year's file, and zero otherwise. An individual will appear in the file every year, until he or she separates. The results indicate that the relationship between ACOL and retention is positive and statistically significant, but small. Were the Army to increase the SRB in Zone D by one levelfrom 0.0 to 1.0--corresponding to a change in ACOL of about $2,400 per year-the average 1-year retention rate would increase by about 0.2 percentage points, and the 4-year retention rate (e.g., from YOS 15 to 19) would increase by 0.7 points. The effect is also small for retirementeligible personnel, whose retention would increase by about 0.5 points for a 1-level SRB increase. Nevertheless, monetary incentives may be an attractive way to retain experienced personnel who are difficult to replace and expensive to train and develop. Future analyses may determine how to best meet skill requirements, including a comparison of the costs of retention with the costs of other mechanisms such as recruitment and retraining.
A. Retirement Eligible and Zone D Special Forces Retention
In this section, we consider the retention of Special Forces-Soldiers serving in CMF 18-who were retirement eligible or in Zone D during the FY1998 -FY2004 period. In the second model presented in the table, CMF 18 Soldiers in Zone D and Soldiers who were retirement eligible are pooled in a single model. The coefficient on the ACOL variable is again positive and statistically significant but the effect, which is the same as that for all retirementeligible personnel, is small. Interestingly, the indicator variables designed to capture the effects of the first through the third year of initial retirement eligibility are negative, statistically significant, and large in absolute value. The estimates indicate that the effect of compensation on the retention behavior of Special Forces Soldiers in Zone D and those who were retirement-eligible is positive and statistically significant. However, the magnitudes of the effects are small.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS FOR THE SRB MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A. "Baseline" Method and Estimating Equation Method
Within the SRB Management System the estimated econometric parameters are used to predict the effects of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) on reenlistments. This is done by estimating the effect of a change from a baseline year, typically the year for which complete data is available that is nearest the prediction year. An alternative to the "baseline" method for predicting change is to predict directly from the estimated model, rather than as a change from the baseline.
The "baseline" method has the advantage of capturing fixed factors that are affecting reenlistment behavior in the baseline period and, presumably, the prediction period, but were not captured in the estimation. On the other hand, transient factors also affect reenlistment rates. These factors, if transient, will not persist. In this case, predicting directly from the estimating equation, without regard to a difference from a baseline, is likely to provide more accurate predictions.
For a particular MOS, the estimation equation as applied to predict retention in year t is of the 
ACOL(t)+ BX(t). ( -r(t)J
If period t is the baseline, then r*(t) is the actual (realized) reenlistment rate for the MOS in year t. We make the period, t, the baseline for the model's prediction by solving for the value of a constant, a 0 , so that the estimated reenlistment equation exactly predicts the actual reenlistment, r*(t), in baseline period t:
Here, a 0 is a constant that encompasses BX(t) and other factors, not measured in the estimated reenlistment equation, that result in a difference between the predicted reenlistment rate r(t) and the actual or realized retention rate, r*(t), in the baseline period t. Solving for the constant, we have:
Then, substituting the value of ao into the previous equation, the prediction equation for year t+1, given that period t is the baseline, is:
In the ideal case, the basic reenlistment rate equation is well specified and captures most of the known time-varying factors that are likely to affect reenlistment rates currently and in the future. In practice, data that may capture a wide variety of factors that may affect reenlistment rates over time is difficult to obtain, or may not exist, in a way that permits estimation of useful parameters. In this case, which is closer to the practical world, the "baseline" approach is a useful substitute for frequent reestimation.
C. Logic for Selecting a Baseline Year in the Analysis Model
Given that that the baseline approach is appropriate, which period should be used for the baseline? The analysis must be based on a solid baseline year to help ensure predictive accuracy. An observed year that was subject to idiosyncratic behavior, on the other hand, will probably not yield good results.
In this section we describe a logic tree for evaluating candidate baseline periods and selecting the most promising for use as the model baseline. Figure 1 summarizes this decision process.
Start with the most recently observed baseline year
The search for a baseline year should begin with the most recent historical year. The main rationale for using the baseline approach is that it will adjust for unobserved factors that change over time and affect reenlistment behavior. Therefore, it is best to use a year as close as possible to the analysis year. If the most recent available year is not appropriate based on the other tests discussed below, the search should proceed backward in time.
When early work begins on a projection year t + I (e.g., in June or July of year t), the most recent year available may be year t -1. After the execution year has begun, year t might be used instead.
Examine Army policies for comparability
Relevant policies should be compared between the candidate baseline year and the analysis year. If the Army has recently changed the eligibility rules for receiving an SRB, it would be better to use a baseline period with policies similar to those that will be used in the analysis year. This comparison does not need to extend to the SRB policies captured in the model, including bonus multiplier levels, lump-sum percentages and award ceilings.
Examine Army reenlistment policies for turbulence
For the candidate baseline year, were there any substantial changes in Army policies related to reenlistments? Recent examples include the change midway through FY 2005 in the length of the reenlistment eligibility window from 12 months to 24 months. FY 2005 would be a poor choice, because the new eligibility criteria were only in place for half of the year.
In summary, the ideal baseline year will have reenlistment-related policies identical to the analysis year and will have experienced little or no turbulence in those policies during the year.
Assess SRB history for baseline year
Turbulence in Army policy makes it difficult to establish a baseline; likewise, frequent withinyear changes in the SRB plan for the baseline period may make for poor predictions. Recall that the adjustment of the reenlistment rates is based on the change in the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL). To calculate this, the model calculates the ACOL for the baseline period and ACOL values for each potential SRB outcome in the projection period. The baseline ACOLs require the designation of a baseline SRB plan.
The ideal baseline year will have a single SRB plan (i.e., list of SRB multipliers by skill, zone and paygrade) for the entire fiscal year; in practice, this has not occurred in recent history for the Army. However, a year in which the plan changed two or three times will provide a more stable baseline than a year in which there were 15 to 20 SRB messages. 
